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State immunity is not a right but rather a prerogative or privilege; 
it cannot be upheld in a way that leads to manifest injustice1
In its recent judgment on the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between 
Germany and Italy 2, the International Court of Justice dealt with the issue of the rela-
tionship between the immunity of states before national courts, and the protection of 
fundamental human rights. One of the most relevant matters presented by the parties to 
the court involved the question of the binding force of the ius cogens exception to state 
immunity. The ICJ rejected this concept, stating that immunity must be granted to the 
perpetrator state even in cases of severe human rights violations amounting to violations 
of peremptory norms of international law. Although this decision was largely antici-
pated, the Court’s formalistic approach was met with a wave of criticism from human 
rights advocates. This paper seeks to evaluate the Court’s line of argumentation, analyze 
the major points of critique of the decision and consider its impact on public interna-
tional law.
Factual background
The case focused on the atrocities committed against Italian citizens by the Ger-
man Reich between 1943 and 1945. These included massacres,  deportations and sub-
mission of the civilian population in Italy to forced labour. The Republic of Germany 
undertook a number of legislative efforts to compensate the victims of the national so-
1 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Trindade – the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
between Germany and Italy.
2 Judgment of 3 February 2012 on the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between 
Germany and Italy.
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cialist regime. They included the Federal Compensation Law of 1953, agreements be-
tween the Republics of Germany and Italy of 1961, as well as the establishment of 
the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation” of 2000 in the federal 
law. Still, many Italian victims did not qualify for any of these reparation programs 
on various grounds.
The direct reason for bringing the dispute before the ICJ were the proceedings com-
menced by the Italian Courts. In 1998, Mr. Luigi Ferrini, an Italian national arrested 
and deported to Germany in 1944, instituted proceedings before the Court of Arezzo 
in Italy. After the case was considered in two instances,  the Italian Court of Cassa-
tion issued a final judgment stating that Mr. Ferrini should be granted compensation 
from the German State. Following this judgment, the Italian Court of Cassation con-
firmed its jurisdiction over the claims against the German Republic in a case concerning 
Giovanni Mantelli and others as well as in the proceedings brought against Mr. Mil-
de, a member of the special division of German armed forces responsible for the massa-
cres in Civitella, Val di Chianna, Cornia and San Pancrazio.
The case before the ICJ was further based on proceedings brought before Italian 
courts involving Greek nationals. The families of victims of the massacre at the Gre-
ek village of Distomo obtained favorable judgments in proceedings against Germany 
before Greek courts,  which awarded them compensation.  However,  the judgments 
could not be executed due to the provision of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure 
requiring the authorization of the Minister of Justice to enforce a  decision against 
a foreign state. After unsuccessful attempts before German courts, the victims sought 
enforcement in Italy. It was granted in 2005 by the Court of Appeal in Florence and 
confirmed by the Court of Cassation. Pursuant to the decision, the claimants filed for 
measures of constraint to be taken against Villa Vigoni, a property of the Republic of 
Germany in Italy.
State Immunity
State immunity protects a state and its property from the exercise of jurisdiction by 
foreign domestic courts. It is divided into jurisdictional immunity which protects a state 
in administrative, civil and criminal proceedings, and enforcement immunity which covers 
the measures of enforcement of the judicial decisions3. Sovereign immunity is distinct 
from immunity of heads of states and diplomatic immunity, although all those types 
of immunity are closely related. State immunity is largely accepted as part of customary 
international law, which was confirmed in the ICJ’s judgment in the case of Jurisdictional 
Immunities.
3 P. T. Stoll, State Immunity,  “Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law”, 2011.
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The concept of state immunity is drawn from the principles of the sovereignty of 
states and their equality which is reflected in the notion “par in parem non habet imerium” 
formulated by Bartolus de Saxoferrato as far back as 1354. With time, state immunity 
was regarded less and less as an absolute privilege. Several restrictions to the principle 
have been accepted by the international community. Firstly,  immunity can be waived 
with the explicit consent of a state (waiver of immunity). Secondly, state immunity covers 
acta iure imperii exclusively, sovereign acts of state, which are to be distinguished from 
the notion of acta iure gestionis, covering the realm of the commercial activities of a state. 
The other possible limitation to state immunity would be applicable in cases of violations 
of human rights. This limitation was first discussed in the Pinochet Case before the UK 
House of Lords and in the Arrest Warrant case before the ICJ. However, the immunity 
of heads of states was the central issue in these disputes and the relevance of their effects 
on state immunity is disputable. The question was recently raised in the Al-Adsani case 
before the European Court of Human Rights, dealing with state immunity from the 
alleged violation of the prohibition of torture.
The Ius Cogens Exception
The idea that international law shall not accord immunity before domestic courts to 
a state which commits violations of fundamental human rights is based on the theory of 
the normative hierarchy of international law. Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties4 provides that a peremptory norm of general international law, accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole and from which no 
derogation is permitted (ius cogens), prevails over any norm of international law which is 
inconsistent with it. As jurisdictional immunity does not have the status of a perempto-
ry norm, it ranks lower in the hierarchy of international law and must give way to a ius 
cogens norm when such a situation arises. In the discussed case, the power of ius cogens 
to derogate colliding norms would extend beyond the direct inconsistency of obligations 
under international law and would also include any overriding obligations that impair 
the effectiveness of the norm5. The proposition of primacy of ius cogens over state im-
munity finds as much support6 as opposition among scholars. An animated academic 
4 155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
5 A. Mills, K. Trapp, Smooth Runs the Water where the Brook is Deep: The Obscured Complexities 
of Germany v Italy, “Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law” vol. 1, 2012, 
p. 153,160; M. Karagiannakis, State Immunity and Fundamental Human Rights, “Leiden Journal 
of International Law” vol. 11 no. 1, 1998, p. 9, 19.
6 Cf. A. Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It 
Wrong,  “European Journal of International Law” vol. 5, 2007, p. 955; L. McGregor, Torture 
and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, “European Journal of Interna-
tional Law” vol. 5, 2007, p. 903; A. Belsky, M. Merva, N. Roht-Ariaza, Implied Waiver under 
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discussion of this concept evolved after the delivery of a  judgment in the Al-Adsani 
case7. As the concept of the primacy of ius cogens over state immunity was rejected by 
the Court with a small majority (9-8), it is not seen as a final resolution of the dispute.
Apart from the argument of the derogating power of ius cogens, the supporters of the 
concept emphasize the effect of peremptory norms for state recognition8. As laid down in 
Art. 41 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility9, states are precluded from recognizing 
as lawful any situation which is an outcome of a breach of an ius cogens norm. Thus, gran-
ting immunity to a state in cases of violations of fundamental human rights would amount 
to recognizing such a situation and assisting in the upholding of it.
Another argument implies the existence of the so-called implied waiver of immunity10. 
It is based on the fact that immunity before domestic courts is not absolute and can be 
waived by the state. This approach is explained by a two-fold argumentation. Firstly, it is 
assumed that the state by implication waives its immunity by committing an act which 
constitutes a violation of a ius cogens norm of international law. Secondly, by ratifying 
a treaty on human rights provisions, states bound themselves to providing effective re-
medies for individuals in cases of violations of these rights. Under such circumstan-
ces, the obligation to protect human rights translates into an implied waiver of immuni-
ty before national courts. It must be noted that the general idea of a waiver of immunity 
was heavily criticized and declared to be unconvincing11.
The Judgment
In the judgment delivered on 3 February 2012, the ICJ decided in favor of the Appli-
cant. It stated that Italy failed to respect Germany’s immunity under international law 
in three instances: (i) by allowing the civil claims based on violations of international 
humanitarian law committed between 1943-1945 to be brought against Germany before 
Italian Courts; (ii) by taking measures of constraint against Villa Vigoni, a property of 
the German state in Italy; and (iii) declaring as enforceable the decisions of Greek co-
urts, which were based on violations of international humanitarian law in Greece. During 
the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International 
Law, “California Law Review” vol. 77, 1989, p. 365; For opposing views cf. L.M. Caplan, State 
Immunity, Human Rights and Ius Cogens. A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, “American 
Journal of International Law” vol. 97 2003, p.741; H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity, Oxford 2005.
7 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom 2001; Appl. no. 35763/97, ECHR 752.
8 A. Orakhelashvili, op.cit., p. 967.
9 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts , UN Doc. A/56/10, adopted 
by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (November 2001).
10 V. Belsky, M. Merva, N. Roht-Ariaza, op.cit.
11 J. Bröhmer, State Immunity and The Violation of Human Rights, Hague 1997, p.190-193; Kara-
giannakis, op.cit., p. 21.
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the proceedings, Italy claimed as part of its defence that international law had develo-
ped certain exceptions to the principle of sovereign immunity, applicable to the case at 
hand. The derogations which they invoked, and which were subsequently rejected by 
the Court, were the ‘territorial tort principle’ and the exception based on the particu-
lar nature of violations of fundamental human rights, the subject-matter of the case12.
The Court examined Italy’s argument in three strands that, according to their cla-
ims,  would cumulatively result in an exception to the rule of state immunity13. Fir-
stly, the acts giving rise to the Italian claims constituted grave violations of humanitarian 
law, amounting to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Secondly,  the rules of law 
which were violated constitute peremptory norms of international law. Thirdly,  the 
lack of any other form of redress rendered the exercise of jurisdiction by the Italian 
court to be a measure of last resort for the Italian victims.
Gravity of violations
In the first strand, the ICJ denied customary status to the public international law 
norm under which, as claimed by Italy, state immunity does not apply where a claim 
concerns redress for alleged violations of international human rights or humanitarian 
law. According to the Court, apart from the decisions of the Italian and Greek courts, 
there is almost no example of state practice to support this claim. In order to draw this 
conclusion,  the Court carefully analyzed the judgments of domestic courts involving 
the question of state jurisdiction in cases of alleged human rights violations14, as well 
as the relevant treaty law15. After considering national case law, the Court concluded that 
states were likely to support the notion of state immunity and found almost no proof 
of practice to the contrary. With regard to treaty law, the United Nations Convention 
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property16 was the subject of thoro-
ugh examination by the Court. Violations of human rights were explicitly discussed as 
a possible exception to state immunity, yet this was not included in the final draft of the 
Convention as the matter was “not yet ripe” for codification17.
This approach was criticized by Judge Yusuf in his dissenting opinion and described by 
him as a “cherry-picking ” approach18. Given the limited amount of applicable case law and 
12 Judgment on the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between Germany and 
Italy, para. 64-108.
13 Ibidem, para. 80.
14 Ibidem, para. 83.
15 Ibidem, para. 88-89.
16 UN Doc. A/RES/59/38.
17 Judgment on the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between Germany and 
Italy, para. 89.
18 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf – the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State betwe-
en Germany and Italy, para. 23.
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the conflicting domestic decisions on application of this exception, the arguments of the 
Court were rather unpersuasive as the other exceptions to state jurisdiction were accep-
ted by it as part of customary international law, despite the similar circumstances of their 
application. Moreover, as the applied approach was based on a comparison of the num-
ber of reasons ‘for’ and ‘against’ the exception, it is hard to substantiate the Court’s deci-
sion not to take into proper consideration the decisions of the Italian and Greek courts19.
Having dealt with the question of the existence of customary international law suppor-
ting the argued exception to the principle of state immunity, the Court turned to a more sys-
tematic argument regarding the consequences of the ius cogens norms involved in the case.
State immunity as a procedural rule
The Court employed clear and logical reasoning. The question of immunity is preli-
minary in nature, thus a domestic court must determine if the immunity is granted to 
a state, before it proceeds to the merits of the case. However, if the question of immunity 
were dependent upon the determination of whether human rights or humanitarian law 
violations had occurred, the court would be compelled to inquire into the merits of the 
case, thus exercising its jurisdiction20.
The Court established that the arguments of the Parties relied on the premise of 
the existence of a conflict between the violation of peremptory norms of international 
law, on the one hand, and the rules of state immunity on the other. In the opinion of the 
Court, no such conflict exists as these norms address entirely different matters 21. While 
state immunity constitutes a “rule essentially procedural in nature”, the peremptory norms 
are of a substantial character 22. The distinction between procedural and substantial rules 
is not new to the jurisprudence of the ICJ23. It has also been drawn upon in decisions of 
regional24 and domestic courts 25 dealing with the issue of the alleged conflict between ius 
cogens norms and immunity of state, and has also been advanced in its legal literature26.
However, it is far from obvious which norms of international law are to be of “procedu-
ral character”. Some scholars, like Stefan Talmon, have attempted to compile a catalogue 
19 Ibidem, para. 24.
20 Judgment on the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between Germany and 
Italy, para. 82.
21 Ibidem, para. 93.
22 Ibidem.
23 In the Arrest Warrant Case the ICJ held that “Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual 
criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts.  While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in 
nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law.”.
24 In the Al-Adsani case involving the freedom from torture the ECtHR decided that state im-
munity is “to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national 
courts’ power to determine the right.”
25 Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1 AC 270, para. 44-45.
26 H. Fox, op.cit., p.525.
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of such norms 27. Others, like A. Orkasheshvili, deny even the possibility of categorizing 
the norms of international law, as no clear criteria has hereto emerged upon agreement 
of states 28. Moreover, the usefulness of this distinction for the practice of international 
law has also been the subject of academic disputes and even Greece, the non-partisan 
intervener, claimed the distinction to have “no logical or, still less legal consequence”29.
Apart from those contestations, another question arises as to whether the employ-
ment of this strict “substantial-procedural” distinction, which results in barring proce-
edings from providing a remedy for violations of human rights, was appropriate in terms 
of being incompatible with the universally accepted idea of justice.
The “Last resort” argument
The last Italian argument implied that Germany was to be denied immunity as the 
victims were deprived of any remedies to preserve the realization of their individual right 
to reparation for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
According to the Court, this argument was also flawed. Once again, the “substantial-
-procedural” was employed. Immunity before foreign domestic courts is to be regarded 
as a totally separate question from the issue of obligations arising from its responsibility 
under international law 30. Moreover, the Court found no basis in customary internatio-
nal law for requiring the existence of alternative means of securing redress for a state’s 
entitlement to immunity 31. In any case, following the Italian argument, the ICJ found 
a difficulty in the practical realization of such an approach. The mere fact that the vic-
tims received no redress is not decisive, as long as the inter-state discussions were still 
ongoing and were showing the prospect of success 32. In such cases, the right to immu-
nity shall prevail. The problem lies in determination of the point when the prospect of 
such an outcome ceases to exist.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Trindade elaborated on the problem of the notion of 
the right to access to justice presented to the parties in the dispute 33, which was not given 
27 Such a catalogue would include e.g. rules on the establishment and composition of a court, its 
jurisdiction,  admissibility of claims or application,  rules concerning preliminary objections, 
implementation of international responsibility.  Moreover,  according to the author the “ru-
les of procedural nature”  are not identical in content with rules of procedure or procedural 
law; S. Talmon, Ius Cogens after Germany v. Italy, Substantive and Procedural Rules Distingu-
ished, “Bonn Research Papers on International Law” no. 4, 2012.
28 A. Orakhelashvili, op.cit., p. 968.
29 Written Statement of the Hellenic Republic.
30 Judgment on the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between Germany and 
Italy, para. 100.
31 Ibidem, para. 101.
32 Ibidem, para. 102.
33 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Trindade – the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
between Germany and Italy, para. 73.
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much attention in the judgment. He observed that the parties understood this in very 
different terms. Germany construed it narrowly, arguing it should be restricted to access 
to the judicial system of the forum state without discrimination and with full procedural 
rights34. Italy argued that it comprises both the right to establish the judicial proceedings 
and the individual right to reparation35. Judge Trindade associates this disagreement 
with the bigger problem of understanding the notion36. Following the assertion of the 
ECtHR in the Hornsby v. Greece Case 37, he contends that the right to receive reparation 
should be seen as one of the essential components of the right to access to justice, pro-
viding its full realization.
Positivism versus Human Rights?
When considering Germany’s claim to immunity,  the Court employed a  positivi-
stic,  source-oriented attitude which is deeply rooted in the tradition of international 
law. However, it must be observed that this formalistic attitude contravenes some basic 
concepts of human rights and humanitarian law such as the right to effective remedy, ri-
ght to compensation for damages resulting from serious breaches of humanitarian law 
or protection from denial of justice.
This calls into question whether this approach is appropriate in cases seeking redress 
for violations of fundamental human rights. At first glance, it could be stated that a ba-
nal issue of logic 38, considered in an a priori position,  in disregard of its consequence 
and purpose, led to a contravention of fundamental values, and in fact of injustice. This 
fact was a particular point of criticism of the supporters of the more value-oriented view 
of international law, also within the Court itself (see the dissenting opinion of Judges 
Trindade and Yusuf ).
International law is state centered. This is a  fact. Although new actors emerge in 
the arena of international relations, the position of states as the main actors remains 
unchanged. The principle of state immunity, created to safeguard states’ special position 
in international relations, stems from this state – centric approach. But it is also a fact 
that the extent of state immunity has evolved. From its original position as an absolu-
te,  it has shrunk to immunity restricted by numerous exceptions. Another remark on 
the evolution of international law would be that the weight that was once attached 
to the prerogatives of states, as projected in Jean Bodin’s vision of state sovereignty, has 
34 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II – Judgment of 19 March 1997.
35 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Trindade – the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
between Germany and Italy, para. 77.
36 Ibidem, para. 221.
37 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II – Judgment of 19 March 1997.
38 Judgment of 3 February 2012 on the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between 
Germany and Italy, para. 82.
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moved towards their obligations as members of the international community. The de-
cision to uphold state immunity in cases of human rights violations, grounded upon 
formalistic grounds, could be seen as a step towards the fossilization of the state – orien-
tated concept of international law. Some practical difficulties in supporting the position 
of denial of state immunity in cases of human rights violations have been pointed out. 
A. Orakhelashvili identifies the deterioration of bilateral relations between the forum 
state and the perpetrator state among the possible risks as well as the ﬂood of litigation 
when the victims come to the relevant forum state to sue the perpetrators 39. These would 
justify considering the approach applied by the Court as a “conflict avoidance technique”, 
resorted to in order to avoid the questions of normative hierarchy 40, which along with 
“excessively formalistic”41 or “illusory” are only a few of the many adjectives used to describe 
the attitude taken.
Conclusions
In 1933, Walter Wheeler Cook, author of numerous publications on the methodo-
logy of law, argued that the “substance-procedure” distinction has no “necessary” con-
tent; that there is no objective line which must be “discovered” and indeed, that different 
lines are drawn in different contexts42. Implying that this had been the Court’s assump-
tion, one could conclude that the Court had discovered the line regarding Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State and decided that state immunity should prevail. The paper does 
not aim to dispute this decision, as it is appreciated that a number of factors based on 
the facts of the case were considered by the Court.
However, it could be argued that the Court could have adopted a different appro-
ach, namely to preserve state immunity on the basis of an a priori “substance-pro-
cedure” distinction, disregarding the importance and normative value of the princi-
ples at stake. The author of this paper would rather suggest a case-by-case approach 
which  would allow a  drawing of the line between the substance and the procedu-
re.  Such a  line would  be construed upon a  balancing of the values at issue,  which 
would be more appropriate. Referring to the title of the paper, ”in practice immunity 
leads to de facto impunity”, as observed by Judge van den Wyngaert, an ad hoc Judge in 
the Arrest Warrant Case43. Applying an in casu approach to the “substance-procedu-
39 Orakhelashvili immediately rejects the argument of both risks stating that no firm evidence in 
favor of the first can be provided, while the avoidance of the latter is safeguarded by the forum 
non conveniens principle.
40 P.  Webb,  Human rights and the Immunities of State Officials,  [in:] Hierarchy of International 
Law: the Place of Human Rights, ed. E. de Wet, J. Widma, Oxford 2012, p. 300, 308.
41 L. McGregor, op.cit., p. 911.
42 Cit. per: A. Mills, K. Trapp, op.cit., p.163.
43 Dissenting Opinion of Judge van der Wyngaert the case of the Arrest Warrant, para. 34.
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re” distinction would help to avoid such controversy as it would allow for a balancing 
of the competing interests and arguments, previously barred on notional and forma-
listic grounds. Furthermore, it would not contravene the idea of distinction itself as 
its functions and content are largely justified, which has already been demonstrated.
Summary
State Immunity or State Impunity? Human Rights and State Immunity Revisited in 
the ICJ’s Judgment in the Case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of a State
The paper aims to comment on the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 
2nd February 2012 in the case of Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between Germany 
and Italy from the perspective of the problem of jurisdictional immunity. In its deci-
sion concerning compensation for atrocities suffered by Italian citizens during World 
War  II granted by Italian courts against the German State as well as the execution 
of the analogical decisions of Greek courts, the International Court of Justice upheld 
the immunity of the German State. The compensation sought by the plaintiffs in the 
national proceedings was to redress massacres on the civil population, deportations and 
forced labour. In its decision the Court analyzed the exception proposed by Italy in three 
strands which, according to the Respondent, cumulatively would result in an exception 
to the rule of state immunity. Firstly, the acts giving rise to the Italian claims constitu-
ted grave violations of humanitarian law; secondly, the rules of law violated constitute 
peremptory norms of international law; thirdly, no other form of redress was available 
rendering the exercise of jurisdiction by the Italian court to be a measure of a last resort 
for the victims.
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